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Abstract
In this paper we address the relativist-perspectival nature of the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement
in terms of preferred factorizations. We also consider this aspect aspect within the generalized definition of
entanglement proposed by Barnum et al. [6, 7] in terms of preferred observables. More specifically, we
will discuss the non-separable relativism implied by the orthodox definition of entanglement, the contextual
relativism implied by its generalization as well as some other serious problems presently discussed within the
specialized literature. In the second part of this work, we address a recently proposed objective-invariant
definition of entanglement understood as the actual and potential coding of effective and intensive relations
[32]. Through the derivation of two theorems we will show explicitly how this new objective definition of
entanglement is able to escape both non-separable relativism and contextual relativism. According to these
theorems, within this proposed relational definition, all possible subsets of observables as well as all possible
factorizations can be globally considered as making reference to the same (potential) state of affairs. The
conclusion is that, unlike with the orthodox definitions, this new objective-relational notion of entanglement
is able to bypass relativism right from the start opening the door to a realist understanding of quantum
correlations.
Key-words: Entanglement, separability, contextuality, relativism, objectivity, relationalism.
1 The Strange (Hi)Story of Quantum Entanglement
The notion of entanglement (Verschränkung) was introduced in Quantum Mechanics (QM) by Albert Einstein,
Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen in their famous 1935 “EPR paper” [45]. That same year, Erwin Schödinger
explicitly defined and named the new born concept [67]. The main purpose of the introduction of entanglement
by Einstein and Schrödinger was to expose the inconsistencies present in what had already become the orthodox
“collapse” interpretation of QM.1 Both Einstein and Schrödinger were trying to expose why “quantum jumps”
precluded the possibility of the theory of quanta to refer to an objectively represented state of affairs. Something,
they feared, had become regarded by the community of physicists as a sort of chimera. As remarked by Alisa
Bokulich and Gregg Jaeger, “[in the EPR paper] the possibility of such a phenomenon [of entanglement] in
quantum mechanics was taken to be a reductio ad absurdum showing that there is a fundamental flaw with the
1The paradox enlightened by EPR had been conceived by Einstein some years before in discussion with Schrödinger. This earlier
Gedankenexperiment, which Einstein regarded as more clear, consisted in entangled particles encapsulated in two different boxes and
was finally published in 1948 [44].
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theory.” In one of his papers from 1935 Schödinger also remarked an astonishing consequence of the orthodox
collapse interpretation of QM, namely, that when two systems get entangled through a known interaction, the
knowledge we have of the parts might anyhow decrease.
“If two separated bodies, each by itself known maximally, enter a situation in which they influence each other,
and separate again, then there occurs regularly that which I have just called entanglement of our knowledge of
the two bodies. The combined expectation-catalog consists initially of a logical sum of the individual catalogs;
during the process it develops causally in accord with known law (there is no question of measurement here).
The knowledge remains maximal, but at the end, if the two bodies have again separated, it is not again split
into a logical sum of knowledges about the individual bodies. What still remains of that may have become less
than maximal, even very strongly so.—One notes the great difference over against the classical model theory,
where of course from known initial states and with known interaction the individual states would be exactly
known.” [67, p. 161]
Einstein’s and Schrödinger’s criticisms to QM through the notion of entanglement were in fact targeting directly
the artificial “collapse” of the quantum wave function. A new “quantum jump” that had been introduced by
Dirac just a few years before in order to bridge the gap between quantum superpositions and single measurement
outcomes [42]. Similar in nature to the original “quantum jumps” that Bohr had introduced in his famous 1913
model of the atom, this new ad hoc process was also completely irrepresentable within the theory. Einstein, was
clearly uncomfortable with this unjustified addition. Targeting the collapse, he is quoted by Hugh Everett [47, p.
88] to have said that he “could not believe that a mouse could bring about drastic changes in the universe simply
by looking at it”. He also shared his fears with Wolfgang Pauli who would later recall:
“Einstein’s opposition to [QM] is again reflected in his papers which he published, at first in collaboration
with Rosen and Podolsky , and later alone, as a critique of the concept of reality in quantum mechanics. We
often discussed these questions together, and I invariably profited very greatly even when I could not agree
with Einstein’s view. ‘Physics is after all the description of reality’ he said to me, continuing, with a sarcastic
glance in my direction ‘or should I perhaps say physics is the description of what one merely imagines?’ This
question clearly shows Einstein’s concern that the objective character of physics might be lost through a
theory of the type of quantum mechanics, in that as a consequence of a wider conception of the objectivity
of an explanation of nature the difference between physical reality and dream or hallucination might become
blurred.” [60, p. 122]
Schrödinger was also disgusted by the introduction of this “jump” to which he would refer with great sarcasm:
“But jokes apart, I shall not waste the time by tritely ridiculing the attitude that the state-vector (or wave
function) undergoes an abrupt change, when ‘I’ choose to inspect a registering tape. (Another person does not
inspect it, hence for him no change occurs.) The orthodox school wards off such insulting smiles by calling us
to order: would we at last take notice of the fact that according to them the wave function does not indicate
the state of the physical object but its relation to the subject; this relation depends on the knowledge the
subject has acquired, which may differ for different subjects, and so must the wave function.” [47, p. 95]
Regardless of the strong and clear arguments presented by the two rebels, mainly due to the triumph of Bohr’s
anti-realist interpretation of QM sealed later by the post-war coming into power of U.S. instrumentalism, the
notion of quantum entanglement remained buried for almost half a century. As Jeffrey Bub [16] explains: “Most
physicists attributed the puzzling features of entangled quantum states to Einstein’s inappropriate ‘detached
observer’ view of physical theory, and regarded Bohr’s reply to the EPR argument (Bohr, 1935) as vindicating
the Copenhagen interpretation.” Physicists were not taught about entanglement in Universities and the notion
became considered as an anomaly arising from old metaphysical discussions, a ghost which had been silently
forgotten by more down-to-earth and useful physical applications.2 This was at least until during the first
years of the 1980s Alain Aspect and his group in Orsay were able to experimentally test in the lab the strange
correlations exposed in the old EPR thought-experiment [3]. Since it was not possible to measure the correlation
between single outcomes —as originally presupposed in the EPR paper—, Aspect used a reconfigured experiment
2As recalled by Lee Smolin [65, p. 312]: “When I learned physics in the 1970s, it was almost as if we were being taught to look
down on people who thought about foundational problems. When we asked about the foundational issues in quantum theory, we
were told that no one fully understood them but that concern with them was no longer part of science. The job was to take quantum
mechanics as given and apply it to new problems. The spirit was pragmatic; ‘Shut up and calculate’ was the mantra. People who
couldn’t let go of their misgivings over the meaning of quantum theory were regarded as losers who couldn’t do the work.”
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proposed by John Bell who a few decades before, during his spare time from his real work at C.E.R.N. in particle
physics, derived an inequality for the correlations imposed by classical probability —something that Boole had
already done one century before.3 The existence of a violation in the Boole-Bell inequality within an EPR type-
experiment implied a violation of classical correlations. This only meant that classical correlations could not
represent consistently the data found within the experiment. Period. It did not logically imply —as it is still
presupposed in great part of the physical and philosophical literature—, the existence of entanglement or quantum
correlations. Something that should have been obvious to everyone from the fact that Boole-Bell inequalities are
a statistical statement about classical probability, not about QM.
Aspect’s experiment became a huge boost for the young discipline called “philosophy of QM”. But its influence
was not restricted to philosophy. The post-war generation of physicists which had been trained with instrumen-
talist values and a purely pragmatic understanding of physics suddenly became aware of the fact that quantum
correlations were much stronger than classical ones. It became evident —to some of them— that the existence of
entanglement in quantum correlations could be used as a resource of information transfer. As described by Bub
[16], “[...] it was not until the 1980s that physicists, computer scientists, and cryptographers began to regard the
non-local correlations of entangled quantum states as a new kind of non-classical resource that could be exploited,
rather than an embarrassment to be explained away.” In this new context, full of new technical possibilities, the
“shut up and calculate!” widespread instrumentalist attitude of physicists had to unwillingly allow the reopening
of foundational and philosophical debates about QM. Very soon, even physicists would come to regard entan-
glement —like Schrödinger had done many decades before— as the most essential feature of QM itself. During
the 1990s, even a new sub-discipline was created in order to discuss the phenomena of entanglement, namely,
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. As part of it, Quantum Information would also became one of the most
important lines of research in physics worldwide. After half a century of hibernation, the problems and notions
addressed by Einstein and Schrödinger were beginning to be openly discussed not only by philosophers but also by
physicists. However, as remarked by Bokulich and Jaeger [9, p. xi] in the introduction to their book, Philosophy
of Quantum Information and Entanglement, “[During the last decades] a large body of literature has emerged in
physics, revealing many new dimensions to our concepts of entanglement and non-locality, particularly in relation
to information. Regrettably, however, only a few philosophers have followed these more recent developments,
and many philosophical discussions still end with Bell’s work.” One decade after the publication of this book,
the situation does not seem to have changed and —apart from few exceptions— philosophers of physics have not
engaged —as they certainly could— in this ongoing technological revolution that is taking place today.
In this work we attempt to critically address the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement in terms of non-
factorizability, as well as its recent generalization in terms of observables [6, 7]. While the first definition is relative
to a preferred factorization of the state of the quantum system, the latter definition of entanglement is relative to
the choice of a subset of preferred observables. Regardless of their differences, both of these notions are explicitly
non-objective, in the sense that they are unable to provide a global, consistent and invariant representation of a
state of affairs. The subject must be necessarily introduced in order to choose between different non-consistent
factorizations and observables. After critically discussing these two definitions as well as some of their problems
already addressed in the specialized literature we continue to discuss a newly proposed objective definition of
quantum entanglement grounded on the actual and potential coding of effective and intensive relations [32]. We
attempt to show, through the explicitly derivation of two theorems, that within this new relational definition of
entanglement, all possible factorizations as well as all possible subsets of observables can be conceived as making
reference to the same (potential) state of affairs in a global, consistent and operationally invariant manner.
2 Orthodox Entanglement and Non-Separable Relativism
The contemporary definition and interpretation of quantum entanglement is intrinsically linked to the triumph,
that took place during the 20th Century, of a purely pragmatic understanding of physics. This victory was
made possible, firstly, by the unspoken alliance between Niels Bohr —maybe the most influential physicist of
the century— and positivists, and secondly, by the post-war convergence of these anti-realist forces into an even
more radical anti-realist scheme called “instrumentalism”. At the beginning of the 1960s Karl Popper, one of the
major figures within the field of epistemology and philosophy of science, wrote in Conjectures and Refutations [63]
that the realist account of physics —the idea that physical theories make reference to physis (or reality)— had
been finally defeated: “Today the view of physical science founded by Osiander, Cardinal Bellarmino, and Bishop
3The relation between the famous Bell’s inequalities from 1964 and Boole’s less known inequalities from 1862, derived almost
exactly one century before, has been explicitly considered by Itamar Pitowsky in [62].
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Berkeley, has won the battle without another shot being fired. Without any further debate over the philosophical
issue, without producing any new argument, the instrumentalist view (as I shall call it) has become an accepted
dogma. It may well now be called the ‘official view’ of physical theory since it is accepted by most of our leading
theorists of physics (although neither by Einstein nor by Schrödinger). And it has become part of the current
teaching of physics.” Popper argued there were two main reasons for having reached this result. The first reason
was the impact of Bohr’s interpretation of QM in the physics community: “In 1927 Niels Bohr, one of the greatest
thinkers in the field of atomic physics, introduced the so-called principle of complementarity into atomic physics,
which amounted to a ‘renunciation’ of the attempt to interpret atomic theory as a description of anything.”4 The
second reason mentioned by Popper was related to “the spectacular practical success of [quantum mechanical]
applications.” According to Popper: “Instead of results due to the principle of complementarity other and more
practical results of atomic theory were obtained, some of them with a big bang. No doubt physicists were perfectly
right in interpreting these successful applications as corroborating their theories. But strangely enough they took
them as confirming the instrumentalist creed.” Of course, one could also argue in favor of instrumentalism that
what physicists had seemingly proved —specially in the influential Manhattan project— was that spectacular
instrumental applications —such as the atomic bomb— could be actually developed without entering philosophical
debates about the meaning and the reference of the theory. However, this —as entanglement would show— was
a very limited conclusion to be drawn.
As it has been argued in detail in [25, 26], the anti-realist approach to physics produced an essentially
inconsistent discourse, still today firmly in place, grounded in two contradictory claims about the theory of
quanta. On the one hand, QM was regarded as a “tool” that should be used by agents in order to predict
measurement outcomes. As famously argued by Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres: [48, p. 70]: “[...] quantum
theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for
the macroscopic events (‘detector clicks’) that are the consequences of experimental interventions. This strict
definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or
theorists.” But on the other hand, it was also sustained —even by extreme anti-realists— that QMmade reference
to a microscopic realm of unseen and irrepresentable “elementary particles”. This inconsistent discourse mixing
an extreme form of pragmatism together with a fictional microscopic realm was constructed by no one else than
Niels Bohr himself. In many different occasions Bohr systematically introduced pictures, principles and concepts
which had no link whatsoever to the mathematical formalism of QM nor the experience observed in the lab. A
very good example of this procedure is the introduction of “quantum jumps” in his own model of the Hydrogen
atom. An idea he also applied in his interpretation of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics. Bohr’s line of reasoning was
exposed during his meeting in 1926 with Erwin Schrödinger in which the existence of “quantum jumps” within the
atom was a kernel point of disagreement. Under the attentive gaze of Werner Heisenberg, Schrödinger presented
many arguments exposing not only the lack of any explanatory power of this “magical process” but also the
contradictions reached when introducing such a-causal “jumps”. The complete lack of conceptual and theoretical
support allowed Schrödinger to conclude that “the whole idea of quantum jumps is sheer fantasy.” [50, p. 74] But
while the Austrian physicist was unwilling to accept the “jumps” —a critical position that would be shared not
only by Einstein but also, as the years passed by, by an elder Heisenberg—, the Danish physicist was ready to
blame the lack of representation to the theory of quanta itself. Instead of providing a reply to the many criticism
presented by Schrödinger, Bohr simply embraced them and turned them completely upside-down as showing the
limits of the theory of quanta itself. Like a great Judo Master Bohr didn’t try to fight against Schrödinger’s
strong arguments; instead, by inverting the direction of their force, he used them as weapons against his enemy:
“What you say is absolutely correct. But it does not prove that there are no quantum jumps. It only proves
that we cannot imagine them, that the representational concepts with which we describe events in daily life
and experiments in classical physics are inadequate when it comes to describing quantum jumps. Nor should
we be surprised to find it so, seeing that the processes involved are not the objects of direct experience.” [50,
p. 74]
According to Bohr, QM went beyond our classical “manifest image” of the world, and thus it came with no surprise
that our (classical) concepts were incapable of explaining what was really going on in the quantum world. We
can only explain what we see in terms of classical physics because experience is, and will always be, classical.
That is the way things are, and there is nothing to be done but accept the limitations we have reached within
science, limitations which —Bohr declared— are not only technological but also ontological. QM had shown us
4It is interesting to notice that pointing his finger to Bohr, the neo-Kantian, Popper seems to have overlooked the deep influence
of his own tradition within the instrumentalist path. In fact, logical and empirical positivism —just like Bohr— had also shifted the
center of analysis from the theory to the subject, from representation to observation and from explanation to prediction.
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the limitations in the possibilities of representation of Nature itself. It is in this way that Bohr was able to turn
his own incapacity to develop a consistent representation of QM into a proof of the theory’s own difficulties and
limits. In the second half of the 20th Century this inconsistent discourse was sedimented and widespread within
both physics and philosophy communities investigating QM. Ever since, the idea that QM makes reference to
“elementary particles” has stood as a dogma which, quite regardless of the lack of theoretical and experimental
support, cannot be questioned. Bohr also devised an escape route, to be used when pushed to address the
theoretical representation of this microscopic realm, which has been learned by both physicists and philosophers.
When confronted to such type of questioning about quantum particles you can always declare that —in fact—
this was “just a way of talking”. This inconsistent discourse has had also deep consequences in the constitution
of the debates about quantum entanglement.
During the mid-1990s, the physicist and philosopher Abner Shimony [68] gave one of the first contemporary
definitions of entanglement: “A quantum state of a many-particle system may be ‘entangled’ in the sense of not
being a product of single-particle states.” Of course, this uncritical application of the notion of “particle” is not
something that can be exclusively blamed to Shimony. During the 1990s the discussions about entanglement
were taking place in an instrumentalist environment with physicists accustomed to talk about “particles” in a
meaningless fashion, just as “a way of talking” —or, as philosophers preferred to term it, as a “useful fiction”. It
is true that both Einstein and Schrödinger used the notion of ‘particle’ in order to discuss about the phenomena
of entanglement, but —let us not forget— they did so as a reduction ad absurdum, to show a problem, not a
solution.5 It is also true that Bell talked about “particles” in the 1960s, but in this case he was arguing in favor of
finding a classical representation to describe quantum phenomena —an idea that Einstein found “to cheap”.6 And
this possibility —contrary to Bell’s intuition— was ruled out by Aspect’s experiments. Today, the unjustified
application of particle metaphysics has reached an unspoken consensus within the specialized literature about
entanglement which can be witnessed in the introduction of most papers on the subject, all of which make explicit
reference not only to “particles” but also to “separability”, “locality” and —even— “purity”. It is then commonly
argued by specialists in the field that entanglement is an “holistic property of compound quantum systems, which
involves nonclassical correlations between subsystems” [53, p. 865]. For example, in the introduction to the
just mentioned book edited by Bokulich and Jaeger, Philosophy of Quantum Information and Entanglement, the
concept is presented in the following manner:
“Consider two particles, A and B, whose (pure) states can be represented by the state vectors ψA and ψB .
Instead of representing the state of each particle individually, one can represent the composite two-particle
system by another wavefunction, ΨAB. If the two particles are unentangled, then the composite state is just
the tensor product of the states of the components: ΨAB = ψA⊗ψB ; the state is then said to be factorable (or
separable). If the particles are entangled, however, then the state of the composite system cannot be written
as such a product of a definite state for A and a definite state for B. This is how an entangled state is defined
for pure states: a state is entangled if and only if it cannot be factored: ΨAB 6= ψA ⊗ ψB .” [9, p. xiii]
The fact that none of these notions —i.e., particle, separability, locality and purity— have been adequately
defined —neither formally nor conceptually— in the context of quantum theory has remained almost unnoticed
to the general physicist community which tends to regard, at least when necessary (i.e., when understanding is
required), this same discourse as devoid of reference, “just as a way of talking” (see for a detailed discussion [35]).
This controversial definition and picture of entanglement has not stopped here. It has been also extended to the
case of mixed states, another very controversial notion introduced within orthodox textbook QM during the 1940s
and 1950s. According to orthodoxy, mixed states are convex sums of pure states. Extending the non-separability
definition of pure states, entangled mixed state are those which cannot be written as a convex combination of
products.
ρmix =
∑
i
pi ρ
pure
i =
∑
i
pi |Ψi〉〈Ψi|
Mixtures imply an ignorance interpretation about the purity of states which, in turn, introduces a distinction
between states which are “purely quantum” and those which are not, namely, mixtures (of pure states). While the
convex elements representing pure states are the “quantum” ones, mixtures are understood as being derived from
5In fact, neither Einstein nor Schrödinger believed in the need to make reference to ‘particles’. For example, in a letter to Max
Born, Einstein wrote the following: “We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the basic
foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not among them.”
6In a letter to Max Born [47, p. 44] he commented: “Have you noticed that Bohm believes (as de Broglie did, by the way, 25
years ago) that he is able to interpret the quantum theory in deterministic terms? That way seems too cheap to me.”
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them. In fact, the orthodox understanding of mixtures applies an ignorance interpretation which is forbidden in
the general case of quantum probability.
The introduction of convex sets in order to describe pure states and mixtures has very serious drawbacks and
problems which have been addressed in detail in [33, 34]. But even leaving behind these deeper criticisms against
the tenability of the whole pure-mixture interpretation of QM, there are serious technical problems coming even
from within the orthodox literature about entanglement. One of the main recognized difficulties is the fact that
the reference to entanglement is dependent on the chosen factorization of the quantum system. As Alejandro de
la Torre et al. have shown explicitly in [22]: “for any system in a factorizable state, we can find different degrees
of freedom that suggest a different factorization of the Hilbert space where the same state becomes entangled.”
Or put more dramatically by Thirring et al. [70]: “for a given quantum state, it is our freedom of how to factorize
the algebra to which a density matrix refers. Thus we may choose! Via global unitary transformations we can
switch from one factorization to the other, where in one factorization the quantum state appears entangled,
however, in the other not. Consequently, entanglement or separability of a quantum state depends on our choice
of factorizing the algebra of the corresponding density matrix.” Let us see this in some detail. In their article
[22], the authors prove that given a decomposition of the Hilbert space H = HA ⊗ HB and a factorizable state
Ψ = Ψ1 ⊗ Ψ2, there exist transformations F = A⊗ I + I ⊗ B and G = A⊗ I − I ⊗ B such that H = HF ⊗HG
and Ψ is not factorizable. In order to prove this result, the authors use the Quantum Covariant Function QCF,
QCF (X,Y,Ψ) := 〈Ψ, XYΨ〉 − 〈Ψ, XΨ〉〈Ψ, YΨ〉.
Notice that a factorizable state Ψ with respect to A⊗ I and I ⊗B satisfies QCF = 0,
QCF (A⊗ I, I ⊗ B,Ψ1 ⊗Ψ2) = 〈Ψ1 ⊗Ψ2, A⊗BΨ1 ⊗Ψ2〉 − 〈Ψ1, AΨ1〉‖Ψ1‖
2‖Ψ2‖
2〈Ψ2, BΨ2〉 = 0.
But the same state Ψ with respect to F and G satisfies QCF (F,G,Ψ) 6= 0. In particular, Ψ is entangled in
H = HF ⊗HG and this shows mathematically that the notion of entanglement depends on the factorization of
the Hilbert space, in other words, it depends on the chosen basis for H. This result has introduced some unease
in the foundational literature. According to John Earman, there are two broad reactions to this “threatened
rampant ambiguity” of quantum entanglement:
“Realism. The Realist claims that the kind of entanglement we should be concerned with is entanglement over
subalgebras that correspond to real as opposed to virtual or fictitious subsystems. Obviously, this distinction
cannot be drawn in terms of purely formal conditions on the algebras but must come from background physics.
[...] But where the hope is utterly dashed and there is no principled way to draw the distinction, the Realist
holds that entanglement ought to be regarded as a moot topic.
Pragmatism. The Pragmatist asserts that there is no metaphysically valid way to draw a line between
subsystems that are ‘real’ and those that are ‘fictitious’ or ‘virtual.’ Any decomposition of the system algebra
into subalgebras meeting appropriate formal criteria is as good a way as any other for defining subsystems.
Thus, contrary to Realism, there is no metaphysically valid distinction to be drawn between ‘real’ entanglement
(i.e. entanglement over ‘real’ subsystems) and ‘faux’ entanglement (i.e. entanglement over ‘fictitious’ or
‘virtual’ subsystems).” [43]
This relativist dependence of the notion of entanglement with respect to different factorizations can be resumed
in the following manner.
Non-Separable Relativism: Given a pure state, the existence of entanglement is relative to the chosen fac-
torization. Consequently, the same state will be entangled or not depending on the factorization considered.
Due to its relative nature, the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement cannot be interpreted as a property
of quantum systems. Instead, it must be regarded as intrinsically relative to the factorization of systems into
subsystems. In this context, entanglement becomes more a way in which the observer chooses to describe systems,
than a property of the systems themselves. This idea seems to flagrantly contradict the original understanding
of entanglement as a (real) property characterizing the relation between quantum particles, presenting instead a
rather controversial reference to the way in which subjects or agents choose to describe the fictitious (or virtual)
interaction between quantum systems. Embracing this anti-realist account even more explicitly, a generalized
notion of entanglement has been put forward by Barnum, Knill, Ortiz, Somma and Viola in a series of papers to
which we now turn our attention.
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3 Generalized Entanglement and Contextual Relativism
The maturity of perspectival-relativism in QM and its generalized acceptance by the physics community seems
to have taken place when Niels Bohr was finally declared the indisputable champion of the EPR battle in 1935.
Forced by Einstein into an uncomfortable debate about the definition of the physical reality of entangled particles,
Bohr had to state more emphatically than ever his perspectival-relativism with respect to measurement situations
and outcomes. Bohr’s principle of complementarity, originally created in order to bring together the inconsistent
representation of quantum objects as ‘waves’ and ‘particles’, was now applied to the mathematical formalism of
the quantum theory itself in order to ascribe the value of properties as relative to the choice of the experimental
set up. As Bohr [11, p. 700] famously argued, the value of complementary properties could not be considered as
prior to the determination of the actual measurement set up since, he argued, “there is essentially the question of
an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior
of the system.” The Danish physicist was applauded by a physics community already in tune with the anti-
foundational postmodern Zeitgeist of the 20th Century in which reality and truth were regarded as metaphysical
hallucinations. Portrayed as a mystic figure of wisdom and knowledge Bohr was contra posed to Einstein, an old
and lonely man who seemed incapable of understanding —what Bohr claimed to be— the deep revolutionary
consequences of QM.
Bohr’s solution to the EPR paradox was not an objective one, it was an intersubjective solution which had the
purpose of erasing any reference of the theory of quanta beyond the choice of particular measurement situations
and outcomes. Let us be very clear about this point. While ‘objectivity’ meant —in the terms inherited from
Kantian philosophy— the possibility to represent consistently a moment of unity in categorical conceptual terms,
in the neo-Kantian terms of Bohrians and positivists, ‘objectivity’ was translated either as ‘faithful observation’
or simply as ‘intersubjectivity’.7 The essential point is that intersubjectivity did not required the conceptual
unity presupposed within objective representations. Bohr had shifted from objectivity to intersubjectivity, but
he was not willing to abandon the term ‘objective’. Thus, he simply renamed ‘intersubjective statements’ as
‘objective statements’. Stressing the claim that his account of QM was as “objective” as classical physics he [36,
p. 98] argued that: “The description of atomic phenomena has [...] a perfectly objective character, in the sense
that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that therefore... no ambiguity is involved in
the communication of observation.” Bernard D’Espagnat explains this quotation in the following manner: “That
Bohr identified objectivity with intersubjectivity is a fact that the quotation above makes crystal clear. In view
of this, one cannot fail to be surprised by the large number of his commentators, including competent ones,
who merely half-agree on this, and only with ambiguous words. It seem they could not resign themselves to the
ominous fact that Bohr was not a realist.” In Bohr’s scheme the experiences acquired by different agents were
simply detached from any common objective reference and representation.8 This also implied a silent replacement
of the notion of object —a conceptual moment of unity categorically constituted through the general principles of
existence, non-contradiction and identity—; by that of event, actual observation, or even, measurement outcome.
These steps were perfectly aligned with Bohr’s instrumentalist understanding of the mathematical formalism of
QM as making exclusive reference to observable predictions.
“The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character,
as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms and specified
by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the
wave-functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use
of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real functions like
densities and currents are only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of individual
events observable under well-defined experimental conditions.” [12, p. 314]
Bohr stressed repeatedly that the most important lesson we should learn from QM was an epistemological one;
namely, that we are not only spectators, but also actors in the great drama of (quantum) existence. This idea
7This also becomes explicit in Bohr’s understanding of the word phenomena. While in the Kantian scheme the term phenomena
implied the necessary reference to a conceptual moment of unity, for Bohr ‘clicks’ in detectors and ‘spots’ in photographic plates
could be also labeled as phenomena. As explained by Hilgevoord and Uffink in their excellent entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia on
Heisenberg’s relations [52]: “Central in Bohr’s considerations is the language we use in physics. No matter how abstract and subtle
the concepts of modern physics may be, they are essentially an extension of our ordinary language and a means to communicate
the results of our experiments. These results, obtained under well-defined experimental circumstances, are what Bohr calls the
‘phenomena’. A phenomenon is ‘the comprehension of the effects observed under given experimental conditions’ (Bohr 1939: 24).”
8In his book, [36], D’Espagnat clearly distinguishes between objective statements and Bohr’s intersubjective statements, which he
calls: weakly objective statements.
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went in line with his pragmatic understanding of physics according to which [13]: “Physics is to be regarded
not so much as the study of something a priori given, but rather as the development of methods of ordering
and surveying human experience. In this respect our task must be to account for such experience in a manner
independent of individual subjective judgement and therefore objective in the sense that it can be unambiguously
communicated in ordinary human language.” All these ideas can be condensed in the orthodox widespread claim
that in QM “the properties of a system are different whether you look at them or not” (e.g., [17]).
When taking for granted —as Bohr did— that experience must be necessarily described in terms of classical
concepts there seems to exist only two possible ways out, either we must change completely the mathematical
formalism (as in Bohm’s theory or GRWs proposal), or we must avoid to talk about physical reality beyond
measurement outcomes (as QBism has explicitly proposed). This latter anti-realist position to which Bohr
contributed so much can be also re-farmed in co-relational terms, something that has been extensively proposed
(e.g., [46, 64]) and has led many [72] to believe that “a quantum state is relative in nature. That is, an observer
independent quantum state is not necessarily the basic description of a quantum system.” It is this possibility
which has been investigated by Howard Barnum et al. in a series of papers [6, 7, 8] which attempt to generalize
the notion of quantum entanglement beyond any objective reference. As recalled by them [8]: “The standard
definition of quantum entanglement requires a preferred partition of the overall system into subsystems —that
is, mathematically, a factorization of the Hilbert space as a tensor product. Even within quantum mechanics,
there are motivations for going beyond such subsystem-based notions of entanglement.” In order to address
quantum entanglement from a more general perspective they propose the following [8]: “the key idea behind
GE is that entanglement is an observer-dependent concept, whose properties are determined by the expectations
of a distinguished subspace of observables of the system of interest, without reference to a preferred subsystem
decomposition.” Thus, avoiding the reference to different factorizations [71]: “Generalized Entanglement (GE) of
a quantum state relative to the distinguished set may then be defined without reference to a decomposition of the
overall system into subsystems (15; 16).” However, GE reintroduces relativism even more explicitly by making
reference to a preferred set of observables (or context) [71]: “entanglement is an inherently relative concept, whose
essential features may be captured in general in terms of the relationships between different observers”. Let us
see how this works in some detail.
In [8], the authors give a definition of entangled state using the notion of cones. Let us start by recalling some
of the definitions. A convex set C is a set in a real vector space V closed under convex combinations, that is, if
x, y ∈ C then tx + (1 − t)y ∈ C for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. An element x ∈ C is called extremal if it cannot be written
as a nontrivial convex combination. In other words, if x = tx1 + (1 − t)x2 with x1, x2 ∈ C and 0 < t < 1, then
x is not extremal. A positive cone is a proper subset K of a real vector space V closed under multiplication by
nonnegative scalars. It is called regular cone if it is:
• convex (equivalently, closed under addition: K +K = K),
• generating (K −K = V , equivalently K linearly generates V )
• pointed (K ∩ −K = {0}, so that it contains no non-null subspace of V ), and
• topologically closed (in the norm topology).
A ray in a cone K is a set given by the intersection of a one-dimensional subspace with K. An extreme ray R of
a cone K is a ray such that no y ∈ R can be written as a convex combination of elements of K that are not in
R. The authors show that a cone is convexly generated by its extreme rays.
Definition 3.1 (Def. 3.3 in [8]) Let K1 ⊆ V1 and K2 ⊆ V2 be two cones. Let pi : V1 → V2 be a linear map
such that pi(K1) = K2. An element x ∈ K1 is called generalized unentangled if either (a) x and pi(x) belong to
extreme rays, or (b) x is a positive linear combination (or a limit of such combinations) of elements satisfying
(a). Then, an element x is called generalized entangled if it is not generalized unentangled. Both notions are
relative to K2 and pi.
Let us show that the standard definition of entangled state is a particular case of a generalized entangled state.
Let H be a Hilbert space and consider the real vector space of Hermitian operators A. Inside A, we have the cone
Pos of positive operators. The extreme rays of Pos are in bijection with pure states (rank one density matrices).
Assume now that we have a decomposition H = H1⊗H2. Then, the partial traces define a map pi : A → A1⊕A2.
The evaluation of pi at a factorizable state |v〉〈v| ⊗ |w〉〈w| gives a pair of pure states
pi(|v〉〈v| ⊗ |w〉〈w|) = (|v〉〈v|, |w〉〈w|) ∈ A1 ⊕A2.
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Then, according to the previous definition, the factorizable states (and separable states) are generalized unen-
tangled. In particular, the previous definition generalizes to a more wider situation. It is true that, as remarked
by Viola and Barum [71, p. 18], “In spite of suggestive points of contact, our approach differs from the [orthodox
one] in (at least) two important ways: physically, the need for a decomposition into distinguishable subsystems
is bypassed altogether; mathematically, the GE notion rests directly (and solely) on extremality properties of
quantum states in convex sets which are associated to different observers.” However, as we mentioned already,
both definitions (i.e., the orthodox and its generalization) are relative to a chosen decomposition H = H1 ⊗H2.
As proved in [22], if we change the decomposition, we arrive at a situation where a (generalized) separable state
becomes (generalized) entangled. Finally, let us also remark that it is possible to give equivalent definitions of
generalized entanglement with convex sets instead of cones (see [8]).
Perspectival-relativism has been always —since the Ancient Greek sophists— related to anti-realist trends of
thought (see [27]). However, Barnum [5, p. 348] seems to propose what we consider to be a very strange idea
according to which relativism in QM should be understood as supporting a realist interpretation of the theory:
“I view the relative state interpretation less as a way of getting the classical world to emerge from Hilbert space,
and more as a way of giving a realistic interpretation to Hilbert space structure in the presence of additional
structures such as preferred bases or subsystem decompositions that represent other aspects of physics.” In this
case, relativism seems to be considered as part of a general realist project which attempts to justify the existence
of preferred factorizations and bases. According to this viewpoint, the realist should content herself with finding
a way to justify the existence of these preferred perspectives. But while in the case of Earman it is argued that
these conditions should come from “background physics”, Barnum [4], advances an even stranger step further
—at lest, for a supposedly realist position— and argues in favor of considering the role of consciousness: “As
I see it, the correct way, in this view, to account for the appearance that there is a single measurement result
is the idea that the experience of a conscious history is associated with definite measurement results, so that
consciousness forks when a quantum measurement is made.” We will come back to these essential points in the
following sections. For now we content ourselves to provide an explicit definition of this relativist contextual
understanding of entanglement.
Contextual Relativism: Given a pure state, the existence of entanglement is relative to a preferred subset of
observables. Thus, the same state will be entangled or not depending on the choice of the specific subset.
To sum up, while the orthodox notion of entanglement presents a definition relative to the factorization of sys-
tems, the notion of generalized entanglement replaces this type of relativism by a contextual one. This contextual
type of relativism in which observers must choose between the actual existence of different and incompatible states
of affairs, all of them contained within the same mathematical representation, is of course highly problematic from
a representational realist understanding of physics which understand theories as providing an objective-invariant
formal-conceptual representation of a state of affairs —let it be classical or quantum. But let’s keep this on hold.
Regardless of these criticisms —which might be considered by many physicists as merely “philosophical”— there
are also serious technical problems recognized in the orthodox foundational and informational literature which
we would like to address in some detail.
4 The Many Problems of Orthodox Entanglement
The exponential growth in the research being done in quantum entanglement due to explosion during the last
decades of quantum information processing as one of the most important lines of research worldwide has also lead
to the findings of several essential technical difficulties —and even inconsistencies— which expose in a different
context the serious difficulties which hunt the definitions discussed in the previous sections. Let us mention at
least some of them.
To start with, the presupposed relation between entanglement and non-locality has been shown to be unsat-
isfactory —to say the least. As resumed by Bokulich and Jaeger:
“There are [...] limitations to using a violation of Bell’s inequality as a general measure of entanglement.
First, there are Bell-type inequalities whose largest violation is given by a non-maximally entangled state
(Acín et al. 2002), so entanglement and non-locality do not always vary monotonically. More troublingly,
however, Reinhard Werner (1989) showed that there are some mixed states (now referred to as Werner states)
that, though entangled, do not violate Bell’s inequality at all; that is, there can be entanglement without
non-locality. In an interesting twist, Sandu Popescu (1995) has shown that even with these local Werner
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states one can perform a non-ideal measurement (or series of ideal measurements) that ‘distills’ a non-local
entanglement from the initially local state. In yet a further twist, the Horodecki family (1998) subsequently
showed that not all entanglement can be distilled in this way —there are some entangled states that are
‘bound’. These bound entangled states are ones that satisfy the Bell inequalities (i.e., they are local) and
cannot have maximally entangled states violating Bell’s inequalities extracted from them by means of local
operations. Not only can one have entanglement without non-locality, but also, as Bennett et al. (1999) have
shown, one can have a kind of ‘non-locality without entanglement’. There are systems that exhibit a type of
non-local behavior even though entanglement is used neither in the preparation of the states nor in the joint
measurement that discriminates the states (see also Niset and Cerf (2006))” [9, pp. xvii-xviii]
As we pointed out earlier, these results are not strange once we recognize that the addressed relation between
entanglement and non-locality comes from a widespread misunderstanding regarding the meaning of the violation
of Boole-Bell type inequalities in EPR type experiments. Even today, while many physicists still tend to believe
that such a violation implies the existence of “something truly quantum and non-local”, the correct conclusion
—known by the philosophy of QM community— to be drawn by the violation of Boole-Bell inequalities is that
such correlations cannot be represented by a classical theory. Period. The uncritical application of locality in
the context of QM is also linked to the notion of separability and its kernel relation to the orthodox definition of
entanglement in terms of non-separable states. Of course, Einstein himself understood very clearly the difficulties
of introducing the principle of separability in QM. As he [14, p. 172] himself remarked in a letter directed to
Max Born: “quantum theory nowhere makes explicit use of this [the separability] requirement.” Regardless of
Einstein’s warning, in the contemporary literature separability has been uncritically translated as (mathematical)
factorizability. This idea is not only ungrounded, it is simply absurd. The factorizability of Hilbert spaces
cannot be consistently interpreted as the separability (or dissection) of systems into subsystems. The product of
subspaces cannot be understood as their addition. The product of two rays (H1 ⊗H2) generates a whole plane
(H12 = H1 ⊗ H2) which obviously contains more points than the ones present when considering the addition
of the original rays. While Rob Clifton has discussed in detail the failure of this interpretation in the context
of the Schimdt (bi-orthogonal) decomposition [20, 21], Dennis Dieks and Andrea Lubberdink have shown that
the labeling in the factorization is unrelated to the existence of particles [41, 40]: “These physical labels do not
coincide with the factor indices occurring in the total quantum state —the latter remain associated in the same
way with all pure one-particle states even in the classical limit, and therefore cannot refer to individual particles.”
Furthermore, as it is well known in quantum logic due to a famous theorem by Diederik Aerts [1], the conjunction
in QM is not the same as the union of sets and quantum systems must be regarded essentially as non-separable.
It is far from clear what is the physical meaning of factorizability in QM and what exactly is its operational
content. In fact, as Aerts has argued, one is forced to adapt the mathematical formalism of QM if one is still
willing to address separable systems [2].
The situation is even worse when considering density operators or matrices. It is well known fact that mixed
states are a necessary extension beyond pure states for measuring matrices (of rank 6= 1) in the lab. But as
explained by Earman [43]: “Since different convex linear combinations can produce the same mixed state, it is
not easy to determine whether or not a given mixed state is indecomposable.” As also remarked by Thirring et
al. [70]: “For mixed states, however, the situation is much more complex [than for pure states] (see, e.g., Ref.
[17]). The reason is that the maximal mixed state, the tracial state 1
D
1D, is separable for any factorization and
therefore a sufficiently small neighborhood D of it is separable too.” It has becomes a difficult technical problem in
the specialized literature to determine weather or not a mixed state is entangled or not [57]. At a more profound
level, one will also need to deal with the serious inconsistencies, analyzed in [33], present within the definition of
pure state itself —also essential in the orthodox definition of entanglement. These inconsistencies also threaten
the extension of entanglement to the case of mixtures [34].
Also, the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement remains linked to the existence of “collapses” which
still, almost one century after its ad hoc introduction, remains with no formal nor experimental support [49].
As remarked by Dennis Dieks [39, p. 120]: “Collapses constitute a process of evolution that conflicts with
the evolution governed by the Schrödinger equation. And this raises the question of exactly when during the
measurement process such a collapse could take place or, in other words, of when the Schrödinger equation is
suspended. This question has become very urgent in the last couple of decades, during which sophisticated
experiments have clearly demonstrated that in interaction processes on the sub-microscopic, microscopic and
mesoscopic scales collapses are never encountered.” The bottom line of this is an essential one. If collapses do not
really exist, then the notion of entanglement, which was created by Einstein and Schrödinger in order to target
the subjective appearance of collapses in measurement, —obviously— needs to be seriously reconsidered.
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Not only the definition, but also the measure of the degree of entanglement in the lab faces serious technical
problems when attempting to follow its orthodox understanding in terms of non-separable pure states. It has
been even argued that the degree of entanglement is a physically ill-posed problem [61]. Mercin Pawowski and
Marek Czachor have analyzed “an example of a photon in superposition of different modes, and ask what is the
degree of their entanglement with vacuum. The problem turns out to be ill-posed since we do not know which
representation of the algebra of canonical commutation relations (CCR) to choose for field quantization. Once we
make a choice, we can solve the question of entanglement unambiguously.” The way to characterize and measure
the degree of entanglement remains today one of the most serious open problems within the foundational literature.
Finally, we might remark that the survey of various operational and non-operational criteria of entanglement by
Dagmar Bruß [15] points to the serious difficulty that the growing number of competing definitions —all of them
grounded on particle metaphysics and collapses— threaten to fragment the literature about entanglement in
smaller and smaller, compartmented debates with no contact between each other. In fact, for the specific case
of indistinguishable particles there is even no consensus regarding the way to define entanglement. As remarked
by Rosario Lo Franco and Giuseppe Compagno [58]: “Quantum entanglement of identical particles is essential
in quantum information theory. Yet, its correct determination remains an open issue hindering the general
understanding and exploitation of many-particle systems” (see also [40, 43]).
We might conclude that if no consensus is reached in the field regarding the very basic definition and meaning
of quantum entanglement, the literature might end up constructing a tower of Babel in which researchers working
in the same field will become unable to understanding each other. Unfortunately, we have already witnessed this
fragmentation in understanding within the interpretational debate about quantum theory which has been recently
characterized by Ádan Cabello as “a map of madness” [18].
5 An Objective Relational Definition of Quantum Entanglement
Perspectival-relativism is a special type of co-relationalism which stresses the specific relation between a per-
ceiving subject and its surrounding. Obviously, this particular type of relation goes hand in hand with those
positions which assume as a standpoint an anti-realist subject-perspective of analysis —i..e, subject-object or
subject-observation relations. Sophistry, empiricism, positivism, Bohrian philosophy and instrumentalism are all
co-relational schemes which take as a standpoint the subjective act of perception given within the process of
measurement. As positivists from the Vienna circle justified in their influential manifesto [19]: “In science there
are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere: all experience forms a complex network, which cannot always be
surveyed and, can often be grasped only in parts. Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure
of all things. Here is an affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the Epicureans, not with the
Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for earthly being and the here and now.” Starting from a perceptive
perspective, observation and measurement become then the necessary foundation of what is considered to be
“scientific”. Observation, considered as an unproblematic given of “common sense” experience, comes always
first and physical theories are just mathematical models (with some additional rules) designed to predict future
experience. As explained by David Deutsch:
“during the twentieth century, most philosophers, and many scientists, took the view that science is incapable
of discovering anything about reality. Starting from empiricism, they drew the inevitable conclusion (which
would nevertheless have horrified the early empiricists) that science cannot validly do more than predict the
outcomes of observations, and that it should never purport to describe the reality that brings those outcomes
about. This is known as instrumentalism. It denies that what I have been calling ‘explanation’ can exist at
all. It is still very influential. In some fields (such as statistical analysis) the very word ‘explanation’ has
come to mean prediction, so that a mathematical formula is said to ‘explain’ a set of experimental data. By
‘reality’ is meant merely the observed data that the formula is supposed to approximate. That leaves no term
for assertions about reality itself, except perhaps ‘useful fiction’.” [37, p. 15]
Realism, on the other hand, is intrinsically related to the origin of both physics and philosophy, both of which
begun with the ancient Greek idea according to which there is something, a fundament, we call physis (or reality)
which comprises the whole of existence. Everything there is, absolutely everything —including ourselves—, is
part of physis. The second essential presupposition is that physis is not chahotic, it has a certain order or what
the Greeks called a logos. Such a logos is expressible through the creation of theories. It is a difficult task to
expose the true logos since, as remarked by Heraclitus, “physis loves to hide.” [f. 123 DK]. Doing so requires
hard work and sensibility, but —following Heraclitus— the latter can be revealed in the former. In a particular
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logos one can “listen” something that exceeds it, that is not only that personal discourse but the logos of physis:
“Listening not to me but to the logos it is wise to agree that all things are one” [f. 50 DK]. We are thus able
to represent physis, to exhibit its logos.9 By being able to subsume the many different phenomena within a
theoretical unity, the claim made by the first realists was that theories were able to capture or express, in some
way, aspects of reality. As we all know, this idea was strongly confronted by sophists, giving rise to an endless
war between realists and anti-relaists.
Thus, we might regard the main point of disagreement between realists and anti-realists as a mater of per-
spective. As Thomas Nagel described, the anti-realist is a perspective from now here in contraposition to the
realist which he ironically referred to as a perspective from no where (see also [5, 69]). While the first group
assumed the down to earth perspective of a perceiving subject, the latter assumed the theoretical perspective of
physis. This makes all the difference. For realists, theoretical representation comes always before observation.
The conditions of observation are derived conceptually and formally from a theory, not the other way around.
As Einstein famously said to Heisenberg: “it is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed.” Only
adequate concepts are capable to explain what has been observed. As Heisenberg [51, p. 264] himself would
make the point: “For an understanding of the phenomena the first condition is the introduction of adequate
concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can we really know what has been observed.” From a real-
ist perspective, observation can never affect the representation of a state of affairs. As remarked by Einstein
[38, p. 175]: “[...] it is the purpose of theoretical physics to achieve understanding of physical reality which
exists independently of the observer, and for which the distinction between ‘direct observable’ and ‘not directly
observable’ has no ontological significance.” Observation and measurement are nonstarters for any true realist.
Realism is not a subjective belief in an interpretation, it is a praxis, a specific procedure in which physicists
seek to create invariant-objective (subject-independent) theoretical (formal-conceptual) representations of states
of affairs (see for a more detailed discussion [25, 26]). Examples of such theoretical productions are Newtonian
classical mechanics, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism or Einstein’s Relativity. The program implies the need
to produce global formal-conceptual representations in which all reference frames and observational perspectives
are consistently considered allowing in this way to detach the subject from the represented course of events.
The specific manner in which theories are able to create (subject-independent) representations of states of
affairs is intrinsically related to two kernel notions of modern physics, namely, objectivity and operational-
invariance. While the first is one of a conceptual nature, the latter is one of a mathematical or formal character.
One is the counterpart of the other. Both act as preconditions of consistency regarding the global representations
constructed by the realist. Of course, within such representations there is no room for preferred reference
frames (bases) nor preferred observational or experimental perspectives. Let us discuss this in some more detail.
Objectivity means the provision of a categorical scheme which is able to account for a multiplicity of phenomena in
terms of a conceptual moment of unity. Following Kant, the notion of ‘object’ must be regarded as a conceptual
machinery capable not only of creating a representational realm in which thinking of experience becomes possible
but also qualified to unify in a consistent manner the different phenomena observed by empirical subjects. In
physics, all perspectives must be considered as equally acceptable. This is in fact the democratic pre-condition
of scientific objectivity. Realism imposes the need that all representations from different viewpoints must be
subsumed within the consistent account of the same state of affairs. Even though there might exist a multiplicity of
different perspectives of analysis, reality must be considered as one and the same —independent of any particular
perspective. Operational-invariance in physical theories capture exactly this requirement in mathematical terms.
In this case, the mathematical representation of the state of a system (i.e., the object in a specific situation)
is given from a specific reference frame (or basis) which can be consistently translated into any other reference
frame (or basis) (see for a detailed analysis [29, 30, 66]). While in the case of classical mechanics this translation
is provided by the Galilean transformations, in the case of relativity theory this is given through the Lorentz
transformations. This is what defines the realist program: the attempt to produce a consistent, coherent and
unified theory, which is also the attempt to produce an invariant-objective (formal-conceptual) representation of
both reality and experience.
In the particular case of QM, the possibility of such a realist development has been investigated by the
logos categorical approach. An approach which, avoiding metaphysical prejudices, attempts to follow the realist
procedure of theory construction. According to this procedure, since in QM we already have an operational
mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for experience, the focus must be centered in the
9As shown by Heraclitus, the logos of theories was never supposed to mirror the logos of physis. One allows to reach the other.
However, the idea that realism implies a a one-to-one correspondence relation between theory and reality has been systematically
applied by anti-relaists in order to create a straw-realist they can fight and easily destroy.
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development of a new conceptual scheme which is able to provide a consistent account of the mathematical
formalism. We already know that the classical atomist representation does not work for this mathematical
scheme; thus, we need to produce a set of completely new non-classical concepts which match the formalism in
an adequate manner —and not the other way around. The thread of Ariadna which has allowed us to escape the
Bohrian-positivist labyrinth has been the well known operational-invariance of the theory of quanta itself, namely,
the Born rule. It is this mathematical expression of the theory which captures the essential connection between
the theory, particular reference frames (or bases) and experience. The Born rule provides the operational invariant
content of QM which, leaving behind dogmatic (atomist) metaphysics and certain (binary) observations, can be
related to a new understanding and generalization of EPR’s famous element of physical reality. According to it,
the probabilistic information supplied by the Born rule should be considered as providing objective knowledge
of a state of affairs [23] —instead of the probabilistic prediction of a single measurement outcome. This can
be done given we abandon the binary reference to actual properties and certain observations and advance into
an intensive representation of a state of affairs. Escaping relativism, we have proven in [30] that our scheme is
capable of bypassing the Kochen-Specker theorem through the introduction of a global intensive valuation which,
in turn, allows us also to produce an objective (subject-independent) invariant (basis-independent) account of
the orthodox mathematical formalism. Let us see this in some more detail.
Let us begin by recalling some results from [30] which allow us to introduce some essential concepts. A Global
Intensive Valuation (GIV) is a function from a graph to the closed interval [0, 1]. A Global Binary Valuation
(GBV) is a function from a graph to the set {0, 1}. The graph that we are interested in, is the graph of projection
operators which we term intensive powers. Let H be a Hilbert space and let G = G(H) be the set of observables.
We give to G a graph structure by assigning an edge between observables P and Q if and only if [P,Q] = 0. We
call this graph, the graph of powers. Among all global intensive valuations we are interested in the particular
class of PSA.
Definition 5.1 Let H be a Hilbert space. A Potential State of Affairs is a global intensive valuation Ψ : G(H)→
[0, 1] from the graph of powers G(H) such that Ψ(I) = 1 and
Ψ(
∞∑
i=1
Pi) =
∞∑
i=1
Ψ(Pi)
for any piecewise orthogonal projections {Pi}
∞
i=1. The numbers Ψ(P ) ∈ [0, 1], are called intensities or potentia
and the nodes P are called powers. Hence, a PSA assigns a potentia to each power.
Intuitively, we can picture a PSA as a table,
Ψ : G(H)→ [0, 1], Ψ :


P1 → p1
P2 → p2
P3 → p3
...
Theorem 5.1 Let H be a separable Hilbert space, dim(H) > 2 and let G be the graph of immanent powers with
the commuting relation given by QM.
• Any positive semi-definite self-adjoint operator of the trace class ρ determines in a bijective way a PSA
Ψ : G → [0, 1].
• Any GIV determines univocally a GBV such that the set of powers are considered as potentially existent.
Proof: See [30].
Definition 5.2 Let G be a graph. We define a context as a complete subgraph (or aggregate) inside G. For
example, let P1, P2 be two elements of G. Then, {P1, P2} is a contexts if P1 is related to P2, P1 ∼ P2. Saying it
differently, if there exists an edge between P1 and P2. In general, a collection of elements {Pi}i∈I ⊆ G determine
a context if Pi ∼ Pj for all i, j ∈ I. Equivalently, if the subgraph with nodes {Pi}i∈I is complete. A maximal
context is a context not contained properly in another context. If we do not indicate the opposite, when we refer
to contexts we will be implying maximal contexts.
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For the graph of powers, the notion of context coincides with the usual one; a complete set of commuting
operators. However, all projection operators can be assigned a consistent value bypassing in this way the famous
Kochen-Specker theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Intensive Non-Contextuality Theorem) If H is a Hilbert space, then a PSA is possible.
Proof: See [30].
This theorem restores the possibility of an objective physical representation of any quantum wave function Ψ.
Contrary to the orthodox interpretation of QM in terms of systems with properties which imply a binary valuation,
our conceptual representation of quantum physical reality is not relative to any particular context, it is global
and essentially intensive.
In turn, our logos approach has allowed us to reconsider the notion of entanglement from a purely mathematical
standpoint in terms of the actual and potential coding of effective and intensive relations between different screens
[32]. Let us see this in some detail.
Effective Relations: The relations determined by a difference of possible actual effectuations. Effective
relations discuss the possibility of an actualist definite coding. It involves the path from intensive relations to
definite correlated (or anti-correlated) outcomes. They are determined by a binary valuation of the factorized
context in which only one correlated node is considered as true in each subgraph, while the rest are considered as
false.
Intensive Relations: The relations determined by the intensity of different powers. Intensive relations imply
the possibility of a potential intensive coding. They are determined by the correlation of intensive valuations.
These relations provide an intuitive grasp of what can be done in a lab and what type of relations are at play.
The following definitions provide a new account of entanglement which rests on the analysis of relational intensive
and effective correlations.
Definition 5.1 (Quantum Entanglement) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related intensively
and effectively we say there exists quantum entanglement between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
According to this definition entanglement relates to the potential coding of intensive and effective relations
between two distant measuring set-ups. We also have the possibility to provide an intuitive non-spatial definition
of separability which relates to the lack of correlations between two distant screens.
Definition 5.2 (Relational Separability) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are not related inten-
sively nor effectively we say there is relational separability between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
It is interesting to notice that our definitions of potential coding in terms of intensive and effective relations allows
us to address a third possibility which considers the cases in which there are only intensive relations involved but
not effective ones.
Definition 5.3 (Intensive Correlation) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related intensively
but not effectively we say there exists an intensive relation between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
This new approach shows not only that it is possible to derive an objective representation for the theory
of quanta but also that metaphysical considerations are essential for the analysis of operational data. As we
have discussed in detail in [28], the reference to intensive data provides a completely new perspective of analysis
for quantum information processing. The essential relevance of intensive relations in QM has been completely
bypassed within the orthodox definition of entanglement which has been exclusively focused on the dogmatic
belief in the existence of invisible and irrepresentable particles which collapse when observed [35]. This dogmatic
beliefs have acted in the philosophical and foundational communities as epistemological obstructions which have
boycotted the possibility of thinking about entanglement in new original and consistent ways. It must be clear
that since the orthodox notion of entanglement is essentially grounded on both ‘particle metaphysics’ and the
existence of ‘collapses’, the rejection of these concepts also implies the rejection of the present definition of
quantum entanglement. Our redefinition beyond particles and ad hoc rules hopes to open a necessary debate
about the notion of quantum entanglement.
In the following section we attempt to show that the logos definition of entanglement is capable to bypass
both the non-separable relativism (section 2) and the contextual relativism (section 3) which hunt the orthodox
definitions.
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6 Relational Quantum Entanglement Beyond Relativism
During the 1980s the Finish physicist Kalervo Laurikainen focused his research in philosophical issues about QM
and, more specifically, the thought of Wolfgang Pauli, a key figure standing just in between Niels Bohr and Albert
Einstein. According to Laurikainen:
“It is not generally known that there was a profound difference in the philosophical attitudes of Niels Bohr
and Wolfgang Pauli (Laurikainen 1985b, section 3). In his address at the Second Centenary of Columbia
University in 1954, ‘The Unity of Knowledge’, Bohr claimed that the observer even in quantum mechanics
can be considered ‘detached’ provided we understand the observation in the right way (Bohr 1955, p. 83). An
observation includes a detailed description of all the experimental arrangements which can have an influence
upon the phenomenon under investigation, and it is finished only when a registered result is obtained which
everybody can verify afterwards. In this sense, Bohr said, an observation is quite objective (which for Bohr
means ‘intersubjective’), and the observer does not have any influence on the result in any other way than by
choosing the method of observation. The result is explicitly associated with a given method of observation.
If physics is understood as a system which makes it possible to govern such objective observational results
—which, however, is only possible in probabilistic sense— then physics, according to Bohr, can even in atomic
physics be considered quite objective and the observer is ‘detached’ in exactly the same way as in classical
physics.” [56, p. 42]
Bohr had sent the manuscript of the paper to Pauli in order to receive his critics and comments. In his reply,
dated February 15, 1955, Pauli tried to explain him —in line with Einstein— that the role of the observer in
classical mechanics was essentially different from the one presented in the orthodox collapse interpretation of QM.
“[...] it seems to me quite appropriate to call the conceptual description of nature in classical physics, which
Einstein so emphatically wishes to retain, ‘the ideal of the detached observer’. To put it drastically the
observer has according to this ideal to disappear entirely in a discrete manner as hidden spectator, never as
actor, nature being left alone in a predetermined course of events, independent of the way in which phenomena
are observed. ‘Like the moon has a definite position’ Einstein said to me last winter, ‘whether or not we look
at the moon, the same must also hold for the atomic objects, as there is no sharp distinction possible between
these and macroscopic objects. Observation cannot create an element of reality like position, there must be
something contained in the complete description of physical reality which corresponds to the possibility of
observing a position, already before the observation has been actually made.’ I hope, that I quoted Einstein
correctly; it is always difficult to quote somebody out of memory with whom one does not agree. It is precisely
this kind of postulate which I call the ideal of the detached observer.
In quantum mechanics, on the contrary, an observation hic et nunc changes in general the ‘state’ of
the observed system, in a way not contained in the mathematical formulated laws, which only apply to the
automatical time dependence of the state of a closed system. I think here of the passage to a new phenomenon
of observation which is taken into account by the so-called ‘reduction of the wave packets’. As it is allowed
to consider the instruments of observation as a kind of prolongation of the sense organs of the observer, I
consider the impredictable change of the state by a single observation —in spite of the objective character of
the results of every observation and notwithstanding the statistical laws of frequencies of repeated observation
under equal conditions— to be an abandonment of the idea of the isolation (detachment) of the observer from
the course of physical events outside himself.
To put it in nontechnical common language one can compare the role of the observer in quantum theory
with that of a person, who by his freely chosen experimental arrangements and recordings brings forth a
considerable ‘trouble’ in nature, without being able to influence its unpredictable outcome and results which
afterwards can be objectively checked by everyone.” [55, p. 60]
Bohr’s misunderstanding with respect to the meaning of objectivity went hand in hand with his misunderstanding
of the fact that Einstein’s relativity theory did not imply any sort of perspectival-relativism. Just like Bohr
had confused the notion of intersubjectivity with that of objectivity, Bohr also confused in several occasions his
relativist-perspectival interpretation of QM with Einstein’s relativity theory. In his Commo paper from 1929 he
wrote the following:
“While the theory of relativity reminds us of the subjective character of all physical phenomena, a character
which depends essentially upon the state of motion of the observer, so does the linkage of the atomic phenomena
and their observation, elucidated by the quantum theory, compel us to exercise a caution in the use of our
means of expression similar to that necessity in psychological problems where we continually come upon the
difficulty of demarcating the objective content.” [10, p. 116]
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This fragment shows the deep failure of Bohr not only to understand the physics behind Einstein’s theory of
relativity, but more importantly, the role of objectivity and invariance in physics as the main conditions for a
“detached subject” representation —as contra-posed to his own perspectival-relativist approach.10
Unfortunately, this confusion has become completely widespread in many relativist-perspectival interpreta-
tions of QM which regardless of their impossibility to provide a global representation of the theory still claim
—following Bohr’s rhetorics— to be both realist and objective [27]. Let us try to be very clear about this es-
sential point. It is obviously true that physical theories require in order to account for any given situation the
specification of a reference frame. This is maybe the very first lesson that one must learn as a physicist, namely,
that the representation of a state of affairs always requires the explicit specification of the formal perspective
from which the situation is being described. Even in classical mechanics, the position or velocity of a body have
meaning only with respect (i.e., relative) to a frame of reference. But of course, this relativism with respect to
reference frames has no ontological content. This relativism evaporates immediately when considering the group
of transformations which allows us to shift the representation of the state of affairs from one reference frame to
another in a consistent (invariant) manner.11 And it is exactly this same operational-invariance —of the values of
the properties relative to different reference frames— which allows us to detach all reference frames (or empirical
subjects) from the particular representation of a (real) state of affairs. In fact, the whole point of talking about
“something real”, is to talk about something independent of any preferred (formal or empirical) perspective. This
is the essentially democratic nature of science which goes against any one claiming to have a preferred access to
reality. The realist cannot accept the existence of a preferred basis or a preferred context in order to consider the
representation of a state of affairs.
Going back to our quotation, the analogy that Bohr attempted to make between relativity and QM is obviously
wrong: Relativity theory is in no way different from classical mechanics with respect to invariance and objectivity.
None of them imply anything like the existence of the “subjective character of all physical phenomena”. On the
contrary, both theories are objective and operationally invariant allowing a detached subject representation of
any state of affairs. The only difference between them is that while in classical mechanics it is the Galilean
transformations which allows us to consider all reference frames as consistently referring to the same real state
of affairs, in the case of relativity theory this is done through the Lorentz transformations. As Max Jammer [54,
p. 132] remarked about our just quoted passage: “Bohr overlooked that the theory of relativity is also a theory
of invariants and that, above all, its notion of ‘events,’ such as the collision of two particles, denotes something
absolute, entirely independent of the reference frame of the observer and hence logically prior to the assignment
of metrical attributes.” The only thing that is “subjective” here is Bohr’s own interpretation of QM, where there
is no global consistency of the (binary) values of projection operators considered from different contexts.12 As
Bohr famously argued in his reply to the EPR paper, the condition to consider a subset of observables as definite
valued was the specification of the reference frame (or basis). Thus, in Bohr’s approach —unlike in Einstein’s
relativity theory— the description of a state of affairs would become intrinsically relative to the agent’s choice of
a single (preferred) context (or basis). Of course, this goes in line with Bohr’s claim that in the great drama of
quantum existence the subject should be regarded not only a spectator but also as actor —something untenable
in the theory of relativity.
As we have shown explicitly in [29, 30] the inconsistency regarding the value invariance of properties is not
a consequence of the mathematical formalism of QM, it is only specific to the consideration of binary valuation
imposed by a dogmatically presupposed actualist (metaphysical) understanding of physics. As we mentioned
above, the failure to understand the consequences of relativism seem also present in Barnum’s considerations [5,
p. 348] who restricts the role of realism —like Earman also does— to the mere justification of the existence of
preferred bases and factorizations: “An important point brought out by the attempt at a relative state interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics is the need to bring in, in addition to Hilbert space, notions of preferred subsystems
(‘experimenter’ and ‘system’ perhaps also the ‘rest of the world’) or preferred orthogonal subspace decompositions
10This essential mistake is also present in Bohr’s famous reply to EPR [11, p. 702]: “The dependence on the reference system, in
relativity theory, of all readings of scales and clocks may even be compared with the essentially uncontrollable exchange of momentum
or energy between the objects of measurements and all instruments defining the space-time system of reference, which in quantum
theory confronts us with the situation characterized by the notion of complementarity. In fact this new feature of natural philosophy
means a radical revision of our attitude as regards physical reality, which may be paralleled with the fundamental modification of all
ideas regarding the absolute character of physical phenomena brought about by the general theory of relativity.”
11As shown in [29], this consistency in the translation of values of properties for different reference frames is what perspectival
interpretations of QM lack completely. Perspectival or relativist interpretations of QM have no global representational unity, and
that is the reason measurement set-ups and preferred bases become essential.
12The impossibility of a global binary valuation was later on explicitly proved by the now famous Kochen-Specker theorem. See
for a detailed analysis [24].
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(choice of ‘pointer basis’ (Zurek, 1981)).” As we have attempted to make clear, one of the essential points of
being a realist is to reject any preferential perspective within the representation of a state of affairs. It is exactly
this independence from preferred viewpoints, reference frames or basis, which has been accomplished in the logos
formulation of QM through the consideration of a Global Intensive Valuation [30]. If the notion of entanglement
is to be understood as a feature of the real word, and not merely a way in which subjects make choices about
fictitious entities, then we must be able to provide an objective account of its relations independently of the
choice of reference frames (bases) or mathematical decompositions (factorizations). In the following, we derive
two theorems which show explicitly how the logos definition of entanglement is capable to escape the relativism
that hunts the orthodox definitions.
By reinterpreting a result from [30] and using our previous considerations we can derive the following important
theorem.
Theorem 6.1 (Basis Invariance Theorem) Let H be a Hilbert space, G its graph of powers and let Ψ :
G → [0, 1] be a PSA. Let C1, C2 ⊆ G be two contexts. The intensities of Ψ over C1 and C2 may be different, but
both determine in a unique way the whole PSA. In other words, the GIV defined by Ψ does not depend on the
basis for H. In particular, since effective and intensive relations are defined globally, the definitions of quantum
entanglement, relational separability and intensive correlation are non-contextual.
As a consequence of the Basis Invariance Theorem just stated, the relational definition of entanglement is shown
to be independent of the choice of any particular basis or context. The choice of the basis or context becomes in
this scheme just the choice of a viewpoint of analysis which is compatible with the choice of any other viewpoint.
Let us now analyze the factorization problem posed in [22]. Let us denote by PSA(H) the set of all possible
PSAs on the Hilbert space H . We can identify this set (after fixing a basis) with the space of density matrices
over H . In fact, given any completely positive trace-preserving map T : B(H1) → B(H2), we obtain a map
T∗ : PSA(H1) → PSA(H2). An example of a completely positive trace-preserving map is the partial trace.
Notice that for each factorization H = H1 ⊗H2, we have a different partial trace, T : B(H)→ B(H1).
Definition 6.1 Let T : B(H) → B(H ′) be a completely positive trace-preserving map between (trace-class)
operators on Hilbert spaces H,H ′ and let Ψ : G(H)→ [0, 1] be a PSA over H. We say that Ψ′ : G(H ′)→ [0, 1] is
a shadow of Ψ if Ψ′ = T∗(Ψ). Specifically, if Ψ is given by a density matrix ρ. Then, Ψ′ is given by ρ′ = T (ρ).
The relevance of this definition is that it allows us to avoid the factorization problem posed by De la Torre et al.
Theorem 6.2 (Factorization Invariance Theorem) Let H be a Hilbert space with factorizations H =
H1⊗H2 = H
′
1
⊗H′
2
. Let T : B(H)→ B(H1) and T
′ : B(H)→ B(H′
1
) be the partial traces of these factorizations.
Let Ψ be a PSA over H and let Ψ1 = T∗(Ψ) and Ψ
′
1
= T ′
∗
(Ψ) the corresponding PSAs over H1 and H
′
1
.
Assume there exists a completely positive trace-preserving map U : B(H1) → B(H
′
1
) such that UT = T ′, or
diagrammatically,
B(H)
T
zz✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈
T ′
$$❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
B(H1)
U
// B(H′
1
)
Then, Ψ′
1
= U∗(Ψ1).
Proof: Straightforward, Ψ′
1
= T ′
∗
(Ψ) = (UT )∗(Ψ) = U∗T∗(Ψ) = U∗(Ψ1).
The previous theorem implies that all factorizations are consistent and that all corresponding shadows of the
PSA are all compatible between each other. In fact, if we have a compatibility U between the factors H1 and
H′
1
, then this compatibility translates itself in a compatibility between Ψ1 and Ψ′1.
Corollary 6.1 All factorizations are compatible with respect to the same PSA.
Proof: Follows from the previous Theorem.
Remark 6.1 Notice that there is a deep relation between factorizing a Hilbert space as H = H1⊗H2 and choosing
a basis for H. In fact, given a basis {vi} for H1 and {wj} for H2, we can construct a basis for H as {vi ⊗ wj}.
Then, we can say that a factorization determines a basis for H from the basis of its factors.
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Thus, the relational definition of entanglement is immune to the contextual relativism discussed in [22]. The choice
of the factorization has no incidence in the intensive and effective relations already contained in the considered
PSA. In the logos approach the choice of the factorization makes reference to the number of intensive powers
considered within a PSA. All choices of different factorizations remain consistent with the same global account
of the PSA.
To sum up, we might conclude that the non-separable and contextual relativisms found in the orthodox
interpretations is bypassed in the new objective definition of entanglement. The choice of bases and factorizations
does not change the intensive and effective relations already contained within the given (potential) state of affairs
described by QM in terms of powers with definite potentia. Thus, all powers and potentia in a given (potential)
state of affairs can be considered as objectively existent, invariant and independent of any particular measurement.
7 Final Remarks
Erwin Schrödinger wrote in 1935 that quantum entanglement should be regarded as “the characteristic trait of
quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought.” It took more than
fifty years for the community of physics to acknowledge this fact. As John Earman [43] makes the point: “With
the rise of quantum computing and quantum information theory there has been a sea change in attitude towards
entanglement: it is not something to be feared but rather is a resource to be exploited.” However, as pointed
out by Alisa Bokulich and Greeg Jaeger [9, p. xiv]: “Despite the fact that the phenomenon of entanglement
was recognized very early on in the development of quantum mechanics, it remains one of the least understood
aspects of quantum theory.” We believe that the deep misunderstandings surrounding this kernel notion in the
orthodox literature are intrinsically related, in part to the widespread instrumentalist approach of physics and
in part to the dogmatic reference to atomist metaphysics. Both instrumentalism and metaphysical atomism act
today as a epistemological obstacles which preclude the possibility of a truly (non-classical) conceptual approach
to the theory of quanta. In this same respect, the rise of entanglement in the new millennia might be taken
as a lesson of the essential role of philosophical conceptual analysis within physics. It is our conviction that it
will not be possible to continue this revolution without truly comprehending the meaning of entanglement. Such
a comprehension implies the need to go not only beyond the instrumental operational prediction of ‘clicks’ in
detectors but also beyond the misleading discourse about “small particles” living in an unobservable microscopic
world.
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